

## Euroskeptic Voting in European and National Elections

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### ABSTRACT

The conventional explanation of voting for the European Parliament maintains that European elections are “second-order” elections in which citizens send a message to their national government. As a result, governing parties normally see significant losses in their vote shares in EP elections. This argument assumes that national elections reflect voters’ sincere preferences, while voters make strategic choices in EP elections. Yet there is no theoretical or empirical reason to assume that voters act strategically *only* in EP elections. We argue that voters in national elections often vote strategically against Euroskeptic parties with whom they otherwise agree, because these parties are much less likely to join a governing coalition after the election. Because the EP does not form a European government, this strategic consideration is absent in EP elections. To distinguish our claim from the conventional argument, we show that (1) Euroskeptic opposition parties do better in EP elections than do non-Euroskeptic opposition parties; (2) a Euroskeptic party in government—which is, incidentally, a rare occurrence—performs better in EP elections than do non-Euroskeptic parties in government; and (3) these effects are less noticeable in majoritarian systems than in political systems characterized by coalition governments.

The conventional explanation of elections for the European Parliament (EP) maintains that they are “second-order” elections (see *inter alia* Reif and Schmitt 1980; Franklin 1996). This argument maintains that citizens do not vote for their preferred candidates or parties in European elections, but use their European vote to send a message to their national government. As a result, governing parties normally see significant losses in their vote shares in EP elections. This affects the democratic legitimacy of the European Union (EU), weakening the EP’s ability to reflect voters’ interests, and strengthening the EU’s reliance on nation-states instead of the European citizenry as a whole.

While this argument claims that voters make strategic choices in EP elections, it assumes that voters behave non-strategically in national elections, which reflect voters’ sincere preferences. There is no theoretical or empirical reason to believe this assumption to be true. If voters act strategically in one setting, we should assume that they vote strategically in all settings—or, at least, we should assume that enough voters behave strategically in all settings so that we can observe some consequences of these strategic choices.

Building on this methodological point, we assume here that electoral choices are strategic at both the national and the European level, and at the state level if relevant. By “strategic,” we mean that voting choices do not fully represent voters’ underlying sincere preferences because voters anticipate the policy effects of coalition negotiations and other legislative behavior (cf. Givens 2005). In particular, voters in national elections will prefer parties with some chance of forming a governing coalition after the election, so that their votes will not be “wasted.” This logic is familiar in first-past-the-post systems, which tend to have smaller numbers of parties than proportional representation systems—and sometimes just two parties.

This premise has observable implications in two areas: minor parties and Euroskeptic parties. Voters will avoid minor parties in national elections, especially minor parties at the ends of the political spectrum, for these parties are unlikely to join any governing coalition. Though the second-order literature has not made explicit claims about minor parties, this claim is consistent with its reasoning. We also argue that voters will avoid Euroskeptic parties, even those that are relatively large and/or within the political mainstream, because coalition bargaining disfavors them (see Pahre 2004; Sitter 2001, 2002; Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001, 2002). Because the EP does not form a European government, this strategic consideration is absent in EP elections. As a result, voters are more likely to support both Euroskeptic and minor parties in EP elections than in national elections. When available, state-level elections provide another level of discrimination because votes for minor parties may be “wasted” in the coalition bargaining, while votes for Euroskeptic parties—if sufficiently large—will not be so wasted. Euroskeptic parties will therefore obtain more votes, and be more likely as coalition partners, at the state level.

As this summary suggests, we do not deny the claims of the conventional argument but do maintain that it is incomplete. Unfortunately, it is difficult to distinguish the two arguments empirically because Euroskeptic parties are also more likely to be in opposition, and vice versa, and Euroskeptic parties are also likely to be minor parties at the fringes of the political spectrum. We must therefore show that (1) Euroskeptic parties in the national opposition do better in EP elections than do non-Euroskeptic opposition parties; (2) Euroskeptic parties do better in state elections than in national elections; and (3) a Euroskeptic party in the national government will perform better in EP elections than do non-Euroskeptic parties in government. We also expect that these effects are less noticeable in majoritarian systems than in political systems

characterized by coalition governments, but a small n make it difficult to evaluate this claim in either direction.

Fully specifying each party as Euroskeptic or not, minor or not, opposition or governing, and then coding for the type of election eats up degrees of freedom very quickly. For this reason, we have not found it practicable to test these propositions in a large-n, cross-national and/or time series data set. Instead, we make more narrow comparisons of electoral results across the national and the European level, and we also examine state-level elections in Europe's federal countries when possible. This strategy isolates voters' strategic choice of party in national elections by looking at both supranational elections to the European Parliament and at sub-national elections to state parliaments in federal countries such as Austria and Germany.

Our argument has implications in three areas. First, and most obviously, it explains variation in electoral outcomes between European and national elections. To some extent, our argument also explains inter-temporal variation in both national and European elections. The logic that we identify may have some effect on state elections.

Second, our argument accounts for an empirical puzzle that the literature has not found sufficiently puzzling. Several countries have Euroskeptic parties that contest only European elections. These have long been important in Denmark, more recently in Sweden and the Netherlands, and intermittently in Austria, France, and the United Kingdom. No country has a *pro*-EU party that contests only European elections. Since public opinion data show that most European citizens support their country's membership in the EU, there is presumably a large latent electorate for pro-EU parties, especially in EP elections in which these parties could campaign solely on a European platform. The absence of such parties is puzzling. Our argument suggests that pro-EU positions are overrepresented in national elections and are therefore well

served by governing and other mainstream parties. As a result, these voters can be mobilized by existing parties in EP elections in a way that underrepresented Euroskeptic parties cannot be. This situation opens up space for Euroskeptic parties in EP elections but not for Europhile parties.

If our claims are correct, these systematic differences between party strength at the national and European levels are an important feature of the European political system. They bias preferences in particular directions on the Euroskeptic dimension, and do not simply reflect transient factors such as the current government or opposition in each country.. In this respect, this bias acts much as the different selection rules of the two chambers in a bicameral legislature, and should be part of our evaluation of the EU political system.

### **Euroskeptic parties, second-order elections, and strategic voting**

Our analysis brings together literatures on Euroskeptic parties and on second-order elections. Interestingly, each literature has a set of well-supported generalizations in its particular area, but the two groups of generalizations are not fully consistent with each other. A theoretical analysis drawing on both can therefore contribute to each area of research.

Like research on any topic, that on Euroskepticism began inductively, describing the phenomenon and working up analytical concepts and categories for it. Much has focused on public opinion toward the EU, relying heavily on the EU's own Eurobarometer studies. Others have examined the relationship between mass Euroskepticism and the Euroskepticism of political parties. For example, some studies have argued for a distinction between "hard" and "soft" Euroskeptics based on a party's opposition to deeper integration as opposed to seeking a

country's exit from the EU (i.e., Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Taggart 1998; Szczerbiak 2001; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002).

Alongside such typological work, others have begun to examine the correlates of Euroskepticism. Research has traced Euroskeptic beliefs to a voter's material interests, the national economic interests of a country; or to a particular ideology (i.e., Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton; 1993; Gabel 1998; Hooghe 2003 *inter alia*). In addition to simple material interests, some have connected Euroskepticism to political attitudes on other political economy matters (i.e., Cichowski 2000; Henderson 2001). Still others find it associated with a person's location on the Left-Right ideological spectrum (i.e., Aspinwall 2000; Marks et al. 2002; Noury 2002).

Many of these behavioralist studies have tended to analyze mass beliefs and voting choices in a straightforward, non-strategic way. This approach leaves several anomalies. First, if votes reflect values directly, it is difficult to understand the systematic differences between elite and mass views on the European Union, or divisions between national and local elites (Hughes *et al.* 2002 *inter alia*). Presumably, both voters and elites for a given party would have similar values if strategic considerations were absent. Second, this behavioralist tradition cannot account for the strategic choices of both voters and parties. Euroskepticism is often a strategic choice of opposition parties (i.e., Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001), who take advantage of voters' desire to punish incumbent pro-EU positions. This regularity is particularly interesting, since pro-EU opposition parties apparently cannot use the EU as a mobilizer in the same way. In short, the literature on Euroskeptic voting behavior has not yet incorporated our understanding of Euroskeptic elite and party behavior, and the strategic nature of elites highlights anomalies in the former.

The literature on second-order elections for the European Parliament addresses strategic behavior in a more satisfactory way, but one that is still incomplete. This literature assumes that voters are primarily motivated by national political concerns. European elections serve a role similar to by-elections in the United Kingdom, state or local elections in some countries with strong parties, and to some extent mid-term congressional elections in the United States. Voters use these opportunities to register their approval or disapproval of the national government, in addition to (or instead of) the issues at hand in that particular contest. Even voting on European referenda such as Maastricht, Nice, or the Constitutional Treaty may reflect short-term considerations of national politics (van der Eijk and Franklin, eds. 1994; Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh 1995). In short, this literature treats both EP elections and national referenda on European treaties in instrumental terms: voters make choices in European elections to influence national politics.

The evidence for this claim is strong. Voters do seem to punish incumbents and reward the opposition. Even so, it leaves several questions. Voters have a large menu of opposition parties to choose from—do they favor some parties over others? The second-order literature does not address this question explicitly, but it would seem to imply that larger parties that provide credible alternative governments would be favored. Certainly a government should be more concerned about losing votes to its credible rivals than to minor and/or extremist parties. Yet, as we will see, these less “credible” opposition parties often gain significantly in European elections.

In addition, it is far from clear why parties that contest only EP elections would gain from second-order voting. Again, second-order voters would probably want to choose a major opposition party, and not a party that does not even contest national elections. An EP-specific

party sends a weak message to the incumbent government, which could dismiss the result as peculiar to European institutions and irrelevant for national politics. Presumably voters for the June list in Denmark and Sweden, for Europa Transparant in the Netherlands, and similar parties in many other countries are choosing *these particular* non-governing parties as a way to express their preferences *concerning the European Union* and not just on national politics. After all, if these voters simply wanted to express opposition to the national government, they could choose the mainstream opposition.

Once we consider such EP-specific parties, other issues appear. If some voters use European elections to express their views on the EU—either in addition to their opposition to the government, or instead of such opposition—we should expect the full set of EP-specific parties to include both pro-EU and anti-EU parties. This does not happen. There are absolutely no pro-EU parties contesting EP elections but not national elections. This pattern demands explanation within a theory that addresses both the second-order nature of voting and the particular choices that voters make among non-government parties.

As we mentioned earlier, any such theory should assume that voters are strategic across all electoral settings. These choices are not too difficult to make, and are easily understood by politicians. Take as an example a series of elections in close succession in which the EU was an important issue. Maltese voters decided, in quick succession, whether to join the EU, the national government that would preside over EU entry, and the makeup of their first EP delegation. The opposition Labour Party opposed EU entry in the referendum, and fought the national election on a platform of not going through with membership. It lost both votes narrowly. As promised in the national election, it then accepted the electorate's decision on membership and pledged that its EP delegation would work for the “best deal” for Malta within

the EU. The electorate preferred this position and found Labour's promises on this point more credible than the pro-EU Nationalist Party. As a result, Labour won three of Malta's five EP seats. Aside from a small "die-hard" faction in the Labour Party, both observers and the elites of both parties interpret these votes as we have here, in terms of a strategically-motivated electorate that favored EU membership but wanted to be represented by more skeptical MEPs who would limit integration in various ways (Barber and Grima 2003; confidential interview 2004).

Our theory addresses the workings of such cases. We distinguish different kinds of opposition parties, in particular Euroskeptic and pro-EU parties. To understand voting behavior in a strategic setting, we begin with the process of forming a governing coalition. We show that coalition formation presents a different problem when a country is a member of the EU than when governments address purely domestic issues. This difference accounts for the tendency of Euroskeptic parties not to join governing coalitions. Knowing this, national voters will be less likely to vote for Euroskeptic parties that they otherwise favor.

The EP, and a few national systems such as the UK, Malta, and Spain, do not have multiparty government. EU issues are also irrelevant in state elections, so this coalition-building argument will not apply. Voters will therefore be more likely to vote "sincerely" for Euroskeptic parties in all these systems. Given the small number of such systems, however, evidence on this point is somewhat more elusive.

### **Coalition formation and European integration**


To show how Euroskepticism affects coalition formation, and how coalition formation affects voters' choices, we begin with the pure theory of coalition formation. We use a spatial model, which represents policy on any issue as a point on a line. For example, we can think of

monetary policy as a line segment whose endpoints are labeled “tight” and “loose.” The spatial model of policy further assumes that every political actor has some ideal policy or *ideal point*, and the actor judges policies by how far they are from that ideal point. Each individual's goal is to obtain a policy that is as close as possible to his or her own ideal point

In a coalitional polity, parties form governing coalitions because none control enough seats to govern alone. The costs and benefits of including each party in the coalition lie at the heart of our analysis. Without modeling the process formally, we do draw on the growing literature on coalition formation in parliamentary democracies (i.e., Laver and Shepsle 1990; Martin and Stevenson 2001; Pahre 1997; Strom 1990).

Figure 1 shows the basic logic of coalition formation. It shows three political parties that

have preferences over two issues, represented by the vertical and horizontal axes. A governing coalition requires a majority of the three parties, which is of course two parties. Any point outside the triangle is inefficient, in that moving policy into the triangle would bring policy closer to at least two and possibly all three




**Figure 1**  
**The Logic of Coalition Formation Without the EU**

parties. A coalition of, say, parties A and B will choose a policy on the AB line because it is efficient for those two parties—moving toward B makes B better off but A worse off, and movements toward A have the reverse effect.

In this model, no coalition is disadvantaged compared to other coalitions: A and B, B and C, or A and C are all equally plausible. This symmetry may disappear when we consider European integration. European integration differs because the national government must negotiate policy with outsiders, namely, the European Union. In effect, the EU is a “mandatory” member of a coalition, and this may make some national parties unattractive or impossible partners. Of course, the EU is not really a mandatory member of any coalition, but the cost to pro-EU parties of not participating in European integration may be so large that anti-EU parties will not be chosen as coalition partners.

Figure 2 illustrates the logic of this argument. Now the three national parties (A, B, and C) control only the horizontal policy dimension, labeled “Home Policy.” All other EU members are treated as a single actor that controls the vertical policy dimension,



**Figure 2**  
**Coalition Formation with EU Policy on the Agenda**

labeled “EU Policy.” We suppose that there is a status quo policy that the national government and the European Union may wish to change. The EU chooses its ideal point on the dimension that it controls, and the home government chooses its ideal point on the dimension that it controls. For simplicity, we suppose that the home government chooses the ideal point of the median party on the horizontal dimension, which is party B.

Any actor compares policy proposals to this status quo, labeled SQ. It is indifferent between the SQ and all points equally distant from its ideal point, a set that describes a circle around its ideal point. This indifference curve is labeled “i” in Figure 2 for each actor (hence  $i_A$ ,  $i_B$ ,  $i_C$ , and  $i_{EU}$ ).

Only a very small set of policy change is acceptable to both C and the EU, shown by the lens lying below and a little to the left of SQ. The smallness of this set reflects the fact that C and the EU disagree strongly about Home policy—for examples, C wishes to retain national autonomy over asylum and integration while the EU wants to harmonize these policies. Parties A and B are much more amenable to compromise, and there are large areas of agreement between them and the EU (specifically, the large lens mostly left of SQ for A and the EU, and the large lens mostly below SQ for B and the EU). Most important, both A and B can agree to reject a (minority) government led by C—parties A and B working together can bring policy much closer to the AB line from the small C-EU wedge described earlier.

To reduce clutter, we do not show the A-B-EU triangle in Figure 2, but the intersection of this triangle and their three indifference sets ( $i_A$ ,  $i_B$ , and  $i_{EU}$ ) shows the set of policies that an AB government might negotiate with the EU. Both parties A and B (and the EU for that matter) will prefer any point in this A-B-EU “win-set” to any point in the C-EU win-set. As a result, parties A and B will avoid forming a government with party C. Of course, there may be non-EU issues that we have not shown that bring party C to a coalition with A or B, but any such coalition would come with significant costs on EU policy issues for A or B if they concede EU policy to C, or significant costs to C if it concedes EU policy to A (B).

In short, the governing coalition game shown in Figure 1 is no longer symmetrical when parties must negotiate with outsiders such as the EU. EU policy is different than other kinds of policies. This asymmetry drives the rest of our analysis.

This asymmetry also provides an indirect definition of “Euroskeptic” political parties. A Euroskeptic party is one whose ideal point on EU policy matters is sufficiently extreme that it other parties will avoid forming a coalition with it. This definition is obviously tautological if we were trying to explain governing coalitions, but we are not. Instead, we will take this tautology as given, and simply assume that at least some voters understand this strategic setting. As a result, voters will know that some parties—which we label “Euroskeptic”—are much less likely to join a governing coalition than other parties are. Voters who consider the coalition process will be less likely to vote for such Euroskeptic parties.<sup>1</sup>

Euroskeptics may not be the only parties that are disfavored in coalition negotiations. For example, minor parties may be mathematically superfluous to any coalition, and therefore unlikely coalition partners. A four-party vote distribution of  $\{A=31, B=31, C=31, D=7\}$ , though contrived, illustrates this point. Any two of the large parties suffice for a minimum winning coalition, and adding D does not bring any non-majority government over the top. There is no incentive for the others to include party D in their coalitions. Voters who care about this coalition process will therefore be less likely to vote for party D.


The strategic setting in Figure 2 has another interesting strategic implication. After parties A and B form a government, they will negotiate some form of integration with the EU. Figure 3 shows one such point as a new SQ. Once this integration has been accomplished, our “Euroskeptic” party C will compare any new policy to this SQ and not to the “original” SQ of

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<sup>1</sup> Compare Givens (2005), who argues that potential voters for Radical Right parties may vote against them if these parties are not coalitionable.

Figure 2. Now, party C and the EU enjoy a rather significant joint win-set, a lens shown as the intersection of their two indifference sets in Figure 3. Party C is no longer disfavored in coalition negotiations, and the asymmetry described above disappears.

In political terms, this will appear as if the Euroskeptic party has accepted existing levels of integration, however reluctantly. This acceptance makes it an acceptable coalition partner again. Such parties are ubiquitous,



**Figure 3**  
**“Euroskeptics” and an Integrationist Status Quo**

and include many Social Democratic or Left Socialist parties in the Nordic countries, for example, In many cases, some underlying principle in their ideology, such as anti-capitalism on the Left or nationalism on the Right, will make such parties oppose *future* integration even as they become reconciled to *past* integration. These parties, sometimes called “soft Euroskeptics” in the literature, will be unattractive coalition partners when new forms of integration are on the agenda. However, these soft Euroskeptics may not suffer any disadvantages at other times, so we treat them as a different category than hard Euroskeptics in our empirical section.

Finally, note that the entire analysis in this section depends on two assumptions that we must bring out here. First, it assumes a political system with parliamentary coalitions. A “two-

party” system with majority governments, such as the UK, would not be subject to these constraints. In such countries, voters can choose any majority they like, knowing that some parties will have much smaller win-sets with the EU than others. Parties in the European Parliament, which lacks government coalitions at all, will also not be subject to this logic.

Second, it assumes that European policy is relevant to coalition formation. In federal systems such as Austria and Germany, state-level coalition negotiations are not affected by EU issues (confidential interviews in Austrian states of Carinthia, Upper Austria, and Vienna). One implication is that states may have coalitions that are impossible at the national level. In Germany, for example, almost all pairwise combinations of major parties have occurred in the states but some (such as those including the Euroskeptic PDS) have been excluded as possibilities at the national level. Austria also has such coalitions, most controversially the Social Democratic SPÖ and the Euroskeptic and right-wing FPÖ (now BZÖ) in Carinthia.


In summary, this section has argued that the process of parliamentary coalition formation treats “Euroskeptic” parties differently than other parties, leading to asymmetries: Euroskeptics are less likely to join governments. This pattern is not unique to Euroskeptics (minor parties are also less likely to join governments) and does not apply equally across all political systems (majoritarian systems, the European Parliament, and subnational systems). Voters who choose parties strategically, and who want to strengthen preferred parties with a chance of joining a government, will behave differently across these environments. We develop the logic of these voting choices in the next section.

### **Hypotheses about voter choices**

Voters make their electoral choices for many reasons. Their choices might mechanically reflect their partisan identification and socialization, their prospective or retrospective evaluation of incumbent performance, policy outcomes, and many other motivations. We will not pretend to review such motives here, focusing more narrowly on voters' preferences over policy. As long as a significant share of the electorate votes strategically to influence policy outcomes, we should observe some effect of the logic developed above. Those effects may be large or small depending on just how

large the policy-oriented strategic electorate is as a share of the total.

Again, we will start with a baseline expectation of voter behavior. Suppose that parties (or legislators) are arraigned on a single Left-Right dimension, and that the legislature



**Figure 4**  
Voter Choices in a Non-Coalition System

does *not* form a government. Inside the legislature, the median voter theorem applies, and the legislature will choose the policy of the median legislator. This situation is shown in Figure 4, where party C is the median party. Expanding this analysis to hundreds of legislators, as in the EP, would not change the analysis qualitatively.

Knowing that party C is at the median, would voters for parties A, B, or C vote non-sincerely? (Voters for parties D and E are symmetric.) A voter for party B could choose any existing or hypothetical party left of party C without changing the median. To see this, imagine moving B's ideal point left and right within that region. If our voter were to support party D or E instead of B, the median would change, to party D's current ideal point. This would make our voter worse off. A similar analysis holds for all other voters. As a result, each will vote sincerely.

The same sincere voting would happen in a two-party system such as Malta, or a system with one-party governments such as the UK or Spain. Take away any three parties in Figure 4, and then consider the voting decision of voters located at the ideal points of the parties thus removed. Each voter wants to strengthen the position of the party closest to her ideal point, since only one party will form the government and will then implement its ideal point.

Returning to the five-party case, our voter's choice is different if these parties must form a coalition. For illustration, suppose that Figure 4 represents a political system that has been found at various times in many countries: a large center-left party B, a large center-right party D, a small centrist party C, and splinter parties to the left and right (A and E, respectively). To sharpen the illustration, suppose that seat shares are  $\{A=6, B=37, C=14, D=37, E=6\}$ . Minimum winning coalitions are BC, CD, BD, and minimum winning connected coalitions are BC and CD.

Voters for either of the two extreme parties A and E cannot really affect the outcome of coalition mathematics here. However, if all of A's supporters voted for B instead, it would be the largest party and would (in most systems) be given the first opportunity to form a government. Party A's supporters would clearly prefer the resulting coalitions BC (or BD, with B senior) to the situation in which party D is largest, which would yield coalitions CD (or BD,

with D senior). Thinking strategically, party A's supporters would therefore vote for party B instead. Of course, party E's supporters would do likewise. The lesson, which is well understood in the literature, is that supporters of small and/or extreme parties may vote for large and/or centrist parties instead of "wasting" their vote on a party that will not join a governing coalition.

A similar calculus follows in a more complicated way with alternative seat distributions, such as {A=8, B=36, C=12, D=36, E=8}. Coalitions such as ABC would be attractive for party A's voters, who must weigh those possibilities against the highly undesirable CDE coalition. Strengthening party B may, again, make good sense for strategic voters.

The literature has not extended this logic to Euroskeptic parties, but it follows directly from the previous section. If a Euroskeptic party cannot accept the EU policy of a coalition government, or if pro-EU parties both prefer forming a coalition with one another over forming a coalition with a Euroskeptic party, strategic voters may abandon the Euroskeptics. Instead, they will choose the coalitionable party that they most prefer, hoping to strengthen it instead.

Alternatively, voters may despair of influencing government policy on the EU dimension and simply vote their preferences over other issues. If we suppose the existence of two policy dimensions, one national and one European, Euroskeptic positions would disadvantage coalitionable parties because of the reasoning outlined so far. These parties would either move their EU policies toward the center, or downplay the relevance of European issues in favor of national issues. This would help explain why the EU is not a salient issue in most national elections. We would expect, however, that the EU would be a more salient issue in majoritarian systems such as the UK, Malta, and Spain, and perhaps also in "semi-majoritarian" systems such

as Ireland, Italy and France. Indeed, the EU has been a salient issue in these countries if they have a significant Euroskeptic part of the electorate, as in France, Malta and the UK.

This EU policy dimension will not affect outcomes for sub-national elections, where the state government has no authority over EU policy. The lack of state or regional authority over European issues neutralizes that issue in voter calculations. We will test this claim in future research.

This analysis suggests that we should see sincere voting on the European dimension in several settings that usually *do not include* national elections. In sub-national elections, voters will vote “sincerely” on the European dimension because it is irrelevant to sub-national politics. In European elections, voters will choose sincerely on the European dimension because strategic voting cannot change the median MEP in a favorable direction. National elections between two parties will also elicit sincere voting on the European dimension.

This analysis should hold even if some voters behave exactly as the second-order literature expects. As we have seen, that literature argues that opposition parties will do better in European elections where voters seek to punish the incumbents. It does not address how voters select among the many opposition parties. Our analysis suggests that a preference for Euroskeptic positions, which voters rationally mute in national elections, will be seen in the choice of opposition parties in EP elections. As a result,

Hypothesis 1. In national elections in systems with coalition governments, Euroskeptic opposition parties do better in EP elections than do non-Euroskeptic opposition parties.

Our analysis has been largely probabilistic and does not exclude entirely the possibility that voters will sincerely support Euroskeptic parties, or that pro-EU parties might form a

coalition with Euroskeptic parties despite the costs. Occasionally one might see a well-supported Euroskeptic party join a coalition government, as we have seen in Austria's Freedom Party or (briefly) the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands. When this occurs, the incumbent Euroskeptics may be punished for their incumbency, just as the second-order literature expects. At the same time, these parties are well positioned to attract the latent Euroskeptic votes of strategic voters.

We can see these contending pressures

Hypothesis 2. In national systems with coalition governments, any Euroskeptic party in government will perform comparatively better in EP elections than do their non-Euroskeptic coalition partners.

The qualifying clause at the start of Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggests the following additional hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. There will not be systematic differences in party support on the Euroskeptic dimension across national, sub-national, and European elections in majoritarian political systems; phrased differently, the second-order hypothesis will be most evident in these countries.

In addition, our analysis is not relevant for countries such as Spain in which Euroskeptic preferences are weak. Again, the second-order hypothesis should be strongest there. We will not test either this claim or Hypothesis 3 in this paper because of inference problems. In addition, we do not deny the conditional applicability of the second-order hypothesis and therefore see no need to pile on evidence in its support.

A final hypothesis follows from our analysis but also cannot be tested because of a lack of variation. Because Euroskepticism is underrepresented in the national legislature in multiparty systems, there will be an underserved market for Euroskeptic parties representing the

country. This market will be served in the EP, and possibly in regional elections, where coalitional calculations are absent. In short:

Hypothesis 4. European Parliament elections (and perhaps some sub-national elections) may be contested by Euroskeptic parties that do not contest national elections, but will not be contested by pro-EU parties that do not contest national elections.



We do not “test” this because it is simply true in the EP. It would be interesting to examine it more closely at the regional level.

In Austria, for example, the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ), which has been uncompetitive for two decades in most of the country, has become a significant minor party in the city of Graz and the region of Styria, where it campaigns on a strongly Euroskeptic plank (see adjacent picture).

In summary, we should see significant patterns between voters’ treatment of Euroskeptic and non-Euroskeptic parties across elections at different levels. These differences may be found alongside second-order effects.

### **Research design and data**

To test these claims, we focus on countries with significant Euroskeptic parties at either the national or European level. Our coverage of new member countries is incomplete because of a paucity of observations and an often-unsettled party system.

Within these countries, we examine parties that express either contingent (soft Euroskeptic) or outright opposition to European integration (hard Euroskeptic). We rely mainly on Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) and on Benedetto (2005) for party classification in the two

categories across various EU countries, and in most instances, we find strong agreement between Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2001) and Benedetto's (2005) classifications. In instances of disagreement, we consulted both secondary and primary sources on specific countries to verify levels of Euroskepticism, especially case studies on Euroskeptic parties in various countries. We also noted parties with Euroskeptic factions or those which appear Euroskeptic in actions (heresthetic), although their ideology is not anti-EU. We classify such parties as pro-EU while noting a Euroskeptic faction in the appendix. By relying on others' classifications as much as possible, we hope to avoid the possibility that our codings drive the empirical results.

To test the hypotheses, we collected and compared cross-national and longitudinal data on national and European elections for several European states beginning with the first EP elections held in 1979. Our focus was primarily on Poland, Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Germany, and Finland—countries with a large number of Euroskeptic parties. (Future research will expand the country coverage of this study.) Table 1 depicts the 25 cases that constitute the core of our analysis.

Table 1 Elections Studied			
Country	National Election	EP Election	Euroskeptics in government
Ireland	1989	1989	No
Ireland	1992	1994	No
Finland	1995	1996	Yes
Finland	1999	1999	Yes
Austria	1995	1996	Yes
Austria	2002	2004	Yes
Denmark	1977	1979	No
Denmark	1984	1984	No
Sweden	1994	1995	Yes
Poland	2001	2004	No
Ireland	2002	2004	No
Denmark	2001	2004	No
Ireland	1977	1979	No
Ireland	1982	1984	No
Ireland	1997	1999	No
Denmark	1988	1989	No
Denmark	1998	1999	No
Austria	1995	1999	No
Germany	2002	2004	Yes
Germany	1990	1994	Yes
Germany	1998	1999	Yes
Sweden	2002	2004	Yes
Finland	2003	2004	Yes
Denmark	1990	1994	Yes
Sweden	1998	1999	Yes

We relied on numerous sources to collect data on national and EP elections including Wikipedia (wikipedia.org), a surprisingly comprehensive data set, parties and elections in Europe data (2005), and the government-issued national reports on domestic and EP elections.

### **Analysis and Results**

We begin by comparing the difference in performance between national and European elections. Simple descriptive statistics show that Euroskeptical parties in opposition perform much

better than non-Euroskeptic opposition parties in EP elections (Table 2). In 14 out of 15 cases examined here, Euroskeptic opposition parties receive a greater percentage of votes in EP elections than in national elections. On average, Euroskeptic opposition gains approximately 9.8 percent, while non-Euroskeptic opposition loses about 2.4 percent of the vote. This vote loss by non-Euroskeptic opposition parties directly contradicts the expectations of the second-order hypothesis. Voters seem to be selecting Euroskeptic parties when they wish to vote for the opposition to the current national incumbents.

The maximum gain for any Euroskeptic opposition party was 18.9 percent, a number substantially higher than for non-Euroskeptic opposition (2.3 percent). The increase is particularly noticeable for hard Euroskeptics (14.07 versus 2.74 for soft Euroskeptics). Our analysis shows that specific opposition parties—those with Euroskeptic identity, especially hard Euroskeptics—are the major beneficiaries in European elections. Our first hypothesis is strongly supported here.

Table 2  
Euroskeptical and non-Euroskeptical parties in opposition: performance in national and EP elections

	No. case	%	Average Vote difference (national/ EP elections)	Min/Max value
Euroskeptical opposition EP > non-Euroskeptical opposition EP	14*	93	Euroskeptical Opposition +9.79  +14.07 (7 hard)** + 2.74 (14 soft)**  Non-Euroskeptical Opposition - 2.42	Euroskeptical Opposition +18.9 (max) + 2.6 (min)  Non-Euroskeptical Opposition + 2.3 (max) -18.3 (min)
Euroskeptical opposition < non-Euroskeptical opposition EP	1***	7	Euroskeptical Opposition +1.6  +1.6 (1 soft)  Non-Euroskeptical Opposition +5.5	Euroskeptical Opposition +1.6 (max) +1.6 (min)  Non-Euroskeptical Opposition +5.5 (max) +5.5 (min)
Total	15	100		

\*Cases included: Poland 2001 (n) & 2004 (EP), Ireland 2002 (n) & 2004 (EP), Denmark 2001 (n) & 2004 (EP), Ireland 1977 (n) & 1979 (EP), Ireland 1982 (n) & 1984 (EP), Ireland 1989 (n) & 1989 (EP), Ireland 1992 (n) & 1994 (EP), Ireland 1997 (n) & 1999 (EP), Denmark 1977 (n) & 1979 (EP), Denmark 1984 (n & EP), Denmark 1988 (n) & 1989 (EP), Denmark 1998 (n) & 1999 (EP), Sweden 1994 (n) & 1995 (EP), Austria 1995 (n) & 1999 (EP), Austria 1995 (n) & 1996 (EP)

\*\* refers to the number of cases that had hard or soft Euroskeptical parties

\*\*\*Ireland 1977 (n) & 1979 (EP)

We find strong support for our second hypothesis. When comparing the difference in results between national and EP elections, we find that non-Euroskeptical parties in government

perform worse than Euroskeptic parties (Table 2). Specifically, we observe that pro-EU governing parties are the ones that, on average, lose the most votes in EP elections in comparison to their performance in national elections in instances when governing parties are all pro-EU or share power with Euroskeptics. While pro-EU governing parties decrease their performance, we find that Euroskeptics governing parties, on average, still perform better in EP elections (+2.7)—a finding that contradicts predictions of the second-order hypothesis. This might reflect voters giving greater weight to EU issues in EP elections.

Interestingly, we do find that the level of Euroskepticism seems to matter in the mixed case-results. Hard Euroskeptic parties in government increase their vote in EP elections in comparison to soft and non-Euroskeptics who actually experience a decrease, albeit a small one (-1.3). Upon closer look, we can observe that hard Euroskeptics are, in fact, the only ones with a positive average difference. This finding possibly suggests that the voters might be less strategic in their voting when soft Euroskeptics are present because these parties are usually in a much better position to enter coalitions as they often do not stray too far from the mainstream governing parties. As shown above, this would likely be the case when soft Euroskeptics accept the European status quo even if they oppose further integration.

Table 3  
Euroskeptical Parties in Government:  
Performance in National and EP Elections

	No. case	%	Average Vote Difference (national/EP elections)	Min/Max value
Government=all Euroskeptical	0	0	NA	NA
Government=some Euroskeptical; some non-Euroskeptical	10*	40	+ 2.70 (Euroskeptical) -1.30 (6 soft) +2.16 (5 hard)  - 7.07 (non-Euroskeptical)	+ 8.8 (max) - 6.9 (min)  +1.0 (max) -17.0 (min)
Government= all non-Euroskeptical	15**	60	- 10.60	- 0.2 (max) -17.3 (min)
Total	25	100		

\* Germany 2002 (n) & 2004 (EP), Sweden 2002 (n) & 2004 (EP), Finland 2003 (n) & 2004 (EP), Austria 2002 (n) & 2004 (EP), Denmark 1990 (n) & 1994 (EP), Finland 1995 (n) & 1996 (EP), Sweden 1998 (n) & 1999 (EP), Finland 1999 (n) & 1999 (EP), Germany 1990 (n) & 1994 (EP), Germany 1998 (n) & 1999 (EP)

\*\* Poland 2001 (n) & 2004 (EP), Ireland 2002 (n) & 2004 (EP), Denmark 2001 (n) & 2004 (EP), Ireland 1977 (n) & 1979 (EP), Ireland 1982 (n) & 1984 (EP), Ireland 1989 (n) & 1989 (EP), Ireland 1992 (n) & 1994 (EP), Ireland 1997 (n) & 1999 (EP), Denmark 1977 (n) & 1979 (EP), Denmark 1984 (n & EP), Denmark 1988 (n) & 1989 (EP), Denmark 1998 (n) & 1999 (EP), Sweden 1994 (n) & 1995 (EP), Austria 1995 (n) & 1999 (EP), Austria 1995 (n) & 1996 (EP)

In short, the evidence from the cases supports most of our expectations. Some of this evidence is also consistent with the second-order hypothesis, but some is not. This suggests that voters viewing EP elections as second-order elections nonetheless choose among non-governing parties in exactly the way that we would expect. This finding suggests, in turn, that voter choice in national elections was strategic, just as voter decisions in European elections are.

## **Conclusion**

This paper has developed a theory of voter behavior in national and European elections in which some part of the electorate votes strategically, and recognizes how coalition bargaining at the national level disfavors Euroskeptic parties. The evidence mostly confirms the hypotheses from the theory. This confirmation provides indirect evidence of the untested proposition about coalition behavior on which this strategic voting rests: all else equal, Euroskeptic parties are less likely to join governing coalitions than pro-EU parties are.

Our argument further implies that there is a systematic difference in preferences between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Because the Council represents only governing parties, it over-represents pro-EU sentiment in each country and thus across Europe. In contrast, the EP better represents Euroskeptic parties and opposition parties—the latter because of the second-order-election effect.

This expectation is the exact opposite of a common claim concerning the European political system, which maintains that the Council represents national interests while the European Parliament often joins the Commission in leading the EU in a pro-integration direction (see *inter alia* Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). Our argument emphasizes the presence of Euroskeptics in the European Parliament, making up 10-20% of the legislature. This body of anti-integrationists has no parallel in the Council of Ministers and exceeds the number of Euroskeptics in the national parliaments.

The effects of this relatively strong Euroskeptic showing in the EP is obscured by the EP's internal organization. The procedural coalition of pro-European socialists (PES) and Christian Democrats (EPP) in the EP, often joined by the Liberals (ELDR), makes the *median voter* of the European Parliament more obvious to observers while obscuring the *full distribution* of preferences in that body. That full distribution includes a significant number of Euroskeptics.

Though they have been easily outvoted in parliaments so far, the apparent secular trend toward greater Euroskepticism throughout the EU will presumably give them a greater role in the future. Our argument suggests that this role will become apparent in the European Parliament long before it affects the Council of Ministers.

At this speculative level, the EU would not seem all that different from other political systems with bicameral legislatures. Here, the Council would be biased toward pro-integrationist positions, the EP against; the Council would also be biased toward centrist parties that are able to form coalitions, the EP toward a fuller representation of the political spectrum. Issue areas in which the Council plays a leading role, such as foreign policy or justice and home affairs, might be pushed in a more integrationist direction than is appropriate under a subsidiarity standard. Issue areas in which the Parliament plays a predominant role, such as the budget, would be less integrationist than appropriate, given the needs of the single market. Whether those particular biases make for good policy is, in light of the still-speculative nature of this part of our argument, very much an open question.

## Appendix: Euroskeptic parties and their performance in national and European elections

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (01)	EP Elect. (04)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Poland	SLD/UP	no/no	yes	41.0	9.4	-31.6		yes	
	PO	no	no	12.7	24.1	+11.4			
	PiS	yes (s)	no	9.5	12.7	+3.2			
	PSL	yes (s)	no	9.0	6.3	-2.7			
	Samoobrona	yes (h)	no	10.2	10.8	+0.6			
	LPR	yes (h)	no	7.9	15.9	+8.0			
	UW	no	no	3.1	-----	- 3.1			
	German Minority	no	no	0.4	-----	-0.4			
							+7.9		
							+9.1 (Euroskeptic)	yes	
								proportional	

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (02)	EP Elect. (04)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Germany	CDU	no (f)(he)	no	29.5	36.5	-7		yes	
	CSU	no (f)	no	9.0	8.0	-1			
	FDP	yes (s)	no	7.4	6.1	-1.3			yes
	SPD	no (f)	yes	38.5	21.5	-17.0			+3.3 (s)
	Greens	yes (s)	yes	8.6	11.9	+3.3			
	PDS	yes (s)	no	4.0	6.1	+2.1			
	NPD	yes (h)	no	0.5	0.9	+0.4			
	BP	no	no	0.02	0.1	+0.98			
	ODP	yes (s)	no	0.1	0.6	+0.5			
	REP	yes (h)	no	0.6	1.9	+1.3			
	PBC	yes (s)	no	0.2	0.4	+0.2			
	GRAUE	yes (s)	no	0.2	1.2	+1			
	SCHILL	yes (s)	no	0.8	0	-0.8			
	Family Party	no	no	0	1	+1			
	Die Frauen	yes (s)	no	0	0.6	+0.6			
								-6.02	
							+4.0 (Euroskeptic)		
								proportional	

sf-denotes faction of the party is classified as soft Euroskeptics, he-denotes heresthetic

Country	Party *	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (02)**	EP Elect. (04)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Ireland	FF	no	yes	41.5	29.5	-12			
	FG	no	no	22.5	27.8	+ 5.3			yes
	Labour	no	no	10.8	10.6	-0.2			
	PD	no	yes	4.0	0	-4.0			
	Green	yes (s)	no	3.8	0	-3.8			
	Sinn Fein	yes (s)	no	6.5	11.1	+4.6			
	Workers Party	yes (s)	no	0.2	0	-0.2			
	Socialist Party	yes (s)	no	0.8	5.5	+4.7			
							+ 5.1 + 5.3 (Eurosk.) proportional		yes

\* Independents are excluded; account for ~11 percent of national elec. vote and ~17 percent for EP vote.

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (01)*.	EP Elect. (04)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Denmark	Liber. Party	no	yes	31.2	19.4	-11.8			
	Social Dem.	no	no	29.1	32.6	+ 3.5			yes
	Danish People	yes (h)	no	12.0	6.8	- 5.2			
	Cons.People	no	yes	9.1	11.3	+2.2			
	Social.People	yes (s)	no	6.4	8.0	+1.6			
	Danish Soc.Lib	no	no	5.2	6.4	+1.2			
	Unity List	yes (h)	no	2.4	0	- 2.4			
	Christian People	no	no	2.3	1.3	-1.0			
	Centre Democrats	no	no	1.8	0	-1.8			
	Progress Party	yes (h)	no	0.6	0	-0.6			
	June Mov.	yes (h)	no	0	9.1	+9.1			
	People Mov.	yes (h)	no	0	5.2	+5.2		+1.9 +7.7 (Eurosk.) proportional	

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (03)**	EP Elect. (04)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Finland	SDP	no	no	24.5	21.1	-3.4		yes	
	KESK	no (f)	yes	24.9	23.3	-1.6			
	KOK	no	no	18.6	23.7	+5.1			no
	VAS	yes (h)	no	9.9	9.1	-0.8			-1 (s)
	SFP	no	yes	4.6	5.7	+1.1			
	VIHR	yes (h)*	no	8.0	10.4	+2.4			
	KIPU	no	no	0.2	0	-0.2			
	KD	yes (s)	yes	5.3	4.3	-1.0			
	LIB/LKP	no	no	0.3	0.2	+0.1			
	PS	yes (h)	no	1.6	0.5	-1.1			
	SKP	yes (h)	no	0.8	0.6	-0.2			
							+1.5		
							+0.3 (Eurosk.)		
							proportional		

\* protest-Euroskeptics, but the party's position on EU is rather ambiguous (Taggart 1998, Raunio 2002)

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (02)**	EP Elect. (04)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Sweden	SAP	no (f)	yes	39.9	23.9	-16.0		yes	
	VP	yes (h)	no	8.3	12.4	+ 4.1			
	FP	no	no	13.3	9.5	-3.8			yes ( total)
	MP	yes (h)	yes	4.5	5.7	+ 1.2			+1.1
	Centre Party	yes (s)	yes	6.2	6.1	- 0.1			Yes (hard/soft)
	MSP	no	no	15.1	17.6	+2.5			+1.2 (h)
	KD	no	no	9.1	5.5	-3.6			-0.1 (s)
	SD	no	no	1.4	1.1	-0.3			
	June List	yes (h)	no	0	14.0	+14.0			
							-5.2		
							+18.1 (Eurosk.)		
							proportional		

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (02)**	EP Elect. (04)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Austria	SPO	no (f)	no	36.5	33.3	-3.2		yes	
	OVP	no	yes	42.3	32.7	-9.6			
	FPO	yes (h)	yes	10.0	6.3	-3.7			yes
	LIF	no	no	1.0	0	-1			-3.7
	Greens	yes (s)	no	9.5	12.9	+3.4			-3.7 (hard)
	KPO	yes (h)	no	0.6	0	-0.6			
	Hans-Peter List	yes (s)	no	0	14.0	+14.0			
	The Left	yes (h)	no	0	0.8	+ 0.8			
							-4.2		
							+17.6 (Eurosk.)		
							proportional		

Country	Party *	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (77).	EP Elect. (79)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Ireland	FF	no	yes	50.7	34.7	-16.0		yes	
	FG	no	no	30.5	33.1	+ 2.6			
	Labour	no	no	11.6	14.5	+ 2.9			
	Sinn Fein	yes (s)	no	1.7	0	- 1.7			
	Workers' Par.	yes (s)	no	0	3.3	+ 3.3			
							+5.5		no
							+1.6 (Eurosk.)		

\* Excludes independents; received ~ 6 percent of vote in national elections and ~14 percent in EP

Country	Party*	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (82)	EP Elect. (84)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Ireland	FF	no	no	45.2	39.2	-6			
	FG	no	yes	39.2	32.2	-7		yes	
	Labour	no	yes	9.4	8.4	-1			
	Greens	yes (s)	no	0	0.5	+0.5			
	Sinn Fein	yes (s)	no	3.3	4.9	+1.6			
	Workers' Par.	yes (s)	no	3.1	4.3	+1.2			yes
							-6		
							+3.3 (Eurosk.)		

\* Excludes independents; received ~ 2 percent of the vote in national elections and ~11 percent in EP elections

Country	Party *	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (89).	EP Elect. (89)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Ireland	FF	no	yes	44.2	31.5	-12.7		yes (for	
	FG	no	no	29.3	21.6	-7.7		total gov. loss)	
	Labour	no	no	9.5	9.5	0			
	PD	no	yes	5.5	11.9	+ 6.4			
	Greens	yes (s)	no	1.5	3.7	- 2.2			
	Sinn Fein	yes (s)	no	0	2.3	+ 2.3			
	Workers' Par.	yes (s)	no	5.0	7.5	+2.5			yes
							-7.7		
							+2.6 (Euroskeptic)		

\* Independents are excluded from here; account for ~ 11 percent of EP vote, 0 in national elections.

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (92)**	EP Elect. (94)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Ireland	FF	no	yes	39.1	35.0	-4.1			
	FG	no	no	24.5	24.3	-0.2		yes	
	Labour	no	yes	19.5	11.0	-8.5			
	PD	no	no	4.7	6.5	+1.8			
	Greens	yes (s)	no	1.4	7.9	+6.5			
	Sinn Fein	yes (s)	no	0	3.0	+3.0			
	Workers' Par.	yes (s)	no	0.7	1.9	+1.2			
	DL	no	no	2.8	3.5	+0.7			
							+2.3		
							+10.7 (Euroskeptic)		yes

\*Excludes independents; received ~ 7 percent of vote in EP elections, none in national.

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (97)**	EP Elect. (99)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Ireland	FF	no	yes	39.3	38.7	-0.6			
	FG	no	no	27.9	24.6	-3.3		yes	
	Labour	no	no	10.4	8.8	-1.6			
	PD	no	yes	4.7	0	-4.7			
	Greens	yes (s)	no	2.8	6.7	+3.9			
	Sinn Fein	yes (s)	no	2.5	6.3	+3.8			
	Workers' Par.	yes (s)	no	0.4	0	-0.4			
	Socialist Par.	yes (s)	no	0.7	0.8	+0.1			
							-4.9		
							+7.4 (Euroskeptic)		yes

\* Excludes independents; received ~ 15 percent of vote in EP elections, none in national ones.

+1.003 (Euroskeptic)

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (77).	EP Elect. (79)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Denmark	Liber.Party	no	yes	12.0	14.5	+2.5			
	Social Dem.	no	yes	37.0	21.9	-15.1		yes	
	Cons.People	no	no	8.5	14.1	+5.6			yes
	Social.People	yes (s)	no	3.9	4.7	+0.8			
	Dan.Soc.Lib.	no	no	3.6	3.3	-0.3			
	Christ. People	no	no	3.4	1.8	-1.6			
	Centre Dem.	no	no	6.4	6.2	- 0.2			
	Progress	yes (h)	no	14.6	5.8	-8.8			
	Justice Party	no	no	3.3	3.5	+0.2			
	Communist	no	no	3.7	0	-3.7			
	Left	no	no	2.7	3.4	+0.7			
	People Move.	yes (h)	no	0	21	+21			
							+0.7		
							+12.0 (Euroskeptic)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (84).	EP Elect. (84)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Denmark	Liber.Party	no	yes	12.1	12.5	+0.4		yes	
	Social Dem.	no	no	31.6	19.4	-12.2		(-0.2)	
	Cons.People	no	yes	23.4	20.8	- 2.6			
	Social.People	yes (s)	no	11.5	9.2	- 2.3			
	Dan.Soc.Lib.	no	no	5.5	3.1	- 2.4			
	Christ. People	no	yes	2.7	2.7	0			yes
	Centre Dem.	no	yes	4.6	6.6	+2.0			
	Progress	yes (h)	no	3.6	3.5	- 0.1			
	Justice Party	no	no	1.5	0	-1.5			
	Communist	no	no	0.7	0	-0.7			
	Social.Labour	no	no	0.1	0	-0.1			
	Left	no	no	2.7	1.3	-1.4			
People Move.	yes (h)	no	0	20.8	+20.8				
							-18.3		
							+18.4 (Euroskeptic)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (88).	EP Elect. (89)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Denmark	Liber.Party	no	yes	11.8	16.6	-4.8		yes	
	Social Dem.	no	no	29.8	23.3	-6.5			
	Cons.People	no	yes	19.3	13.3	-6.0			
	Social.People	yes (s)	no	13.0	9.1	-3.9			
	Dan.Soc.Lib.	no	yes	5.6	2.8	-2.8			
	Christ. People	no	no	2.0	2.7	+0.4			yes
	Centre Dem.	no	no	4.7	7.9	+3.2			
	Progress	yes (h)	no	9.0	5.3	-3.7			
	Communist	no	no	0.8	0	-0.8			
	Left	no	no	0.6	0	-0.6			
	Greens	no	no	1.4	0	-1.4			
	People Move.	yes (h)	no	0	18.9	+18.9			
							-5.7		
							+11.3 (Euroskeptic)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (90).	EP Elect. (94)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Denmark	Liber.Party	no	no	15.8	19	+3.2			
	Social Dem.	no	yes	37.4	15.8	-21.6		no	
	Cons.People	no	no	16.0	17.7	+1.7			
	Social.People	yes (s)	yes	8.3	8.6	+0.3			
	Dan.Soc.Lib.	no	no	3.5	8.5	+5.0			
	Unity List	yes (h)	no	1.7	0	-1.7			
	Christ. People	no	yes	2.3	1.1	-1.2			yes
	Centre Dem.	no	yes	5.1	0.9	-4.2			+0.3(s)
	Progress	yes (h)	no	6.4	2.9	-3.5			
	People Move.	yes (h)	no	0	10.3	+10.3			
	June Move.	yes (h)	no	0	15.2	+15.2			
							+9.9		
							+20.3 (Euroskeptic)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (98)**	EP Elect. (99)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Denmark	Liber.Party	no	no	24	23.4	-1.3			
	Social Dem.	no	yes	35.9	16.5	-19.4		yes	
	Danish People	yes (h)	no	7.4	5.8	-1.6			
	Cons.People	no	no	8.9	8.5	-0.4			
	Social.People	yes (s)	no	7.6	7.1	-0.5			yes
	Dan.Soc.Lib.	no	yes	3.9	9.1	+5.2			
	Unity List	yes (h)	no	2.7	0	-2.7			
	Christ.People	no	no	2.5	2.0	-0.5			
	Centre Dem.	no	no	4.3	3.5	-0.8			
	Progress	yes (h)	no	2.4	0.7	-1.7			
	People Move.	yes (h)	no	0	7.3	+7.3			
	June Move.	yes (h)	no	0	16.1	+16.1			
								-3	
							+16.9 (Euroskeptic)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptic	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (95)**	EP Elect. (96)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Finland	SDP	no	yes	28.3	21.5	- 6.8		yes	
	KESK	no (f)	no	19.9	24.4	+4.5			
	KOK	no	yes	17.9	20.2	+2.3			
	VAS	yes (h)	yes	11.2	10.5	-0.7			yes
	SFP	no	yes	5.1	5.8	+0.7			+0.4
	VIHR	yes (h)	yes	6.5	7.6	+1.1			+0.4 (h)
	KIPU	no	no	0.3	0	-0.3			
	SMP	no	no	1.3	0	-1.3			
	KD	yes (s)	no	3.0	2.8	-0.2			
	LIB/LKP	no	no	0.6	0.4	-0.2			
	PS	yes (h)	no	2.8	0	-2.8			
	UE Alternative	yes (h)	no	0	2.1	+2.1			
								-2.7	
							+0.9 (Euroskeptic)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptical	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (99).	EP Elect. (99)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Finland	SDP	no	yes	22.9	17.9	-5		no	
	KESK	no (f)	no	22.4	21.3	-1.1			
	KOK	no	yes	21.0	25.3	+4.3			
	VAS	yes (h)	yes	10.9	9.1	-1.8			Yes
	SFP	no	yes	5.1	6.8	+1.7			+4.1
	VIHR	yes (h)	yes	7.5	13.4	+5.9			+4.1 (h)
	KD	yes (s)	no	4.2	2.4	-1.8			
	LIB/LKP	no	no	0.2	0	-0.2			
	PS	yes (h)	no	1.0	0	-1.0			
	SKP	yes (h)	no	0	0.6	+0.6			

-1.3  
-2.2 (Euroskeptical)

Country	Party	Euroskeptical	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (94)**	EP Elect. (95)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Sweden	SAP	no (f)	yes	45.4	28.1	-17.3		yes	
	VP	yes (h)	no	6.2	12.9	+6.7			
	FP	no	no	7.2	4.8	-2.4			
	MP	yes (h)	no	5.8	17.2	+11.4			
	Centre	yes (s)	no	7.7	7.2	- 0.5			
	MSP	no	no	22.3	23.2	+ 0.9			
	KD	no	no	4.1	3.9	- 0.2			
	NYD	no	no	1.2	0.1	- 1.1			
	Fairness List	yes (h)	no	0	0.6	+ 0.6			
	Free Criticism	yes (h)	no	0	0.7	+ 0.7			

-2.8  
+18.9 (Euroskeptical)

Country	Party	Euroskeptical	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (98)**	EP Elect. (99)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Sweden	SAP	no (f)	yes	36.6	26	-10.6		No	
	VP	yes (h)	yes	12.0	15.8	+ 3.8			Yes (total)
	FP	no	no	4.7	13.9	+ 9.2			+8.8
	MP	yes (h)	yes	4.5	9.5	+ 5			Yes (hard)
	Centre	yes	no	5.1	6	- 0.9			+8.8 (h)
	MSP	no	no	22.7	20.7	-2			
	KD	no	no	11.8	7.6	-4.2			
	SD	yes	no	0.4	0.3	-0.1			
							+3		
							- 1 (Euroskeptical)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptical	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (95)**	EP Elect. (96)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Austria	SPO	no (f)	yes	38.1	29.1	-9		yes	
	OVP	no	yes	28.3	29.6	+1.3			No
	FPO	yes (s)	no	22	27.5	+5.5			-9 (s)
	LIF	no	no	5.5	4.3	-1.2			
	Greens	yes (s)	no	4.8	6.8	+2			
	KPO	no	no	0.3	0.5	+0.2			
							-1		
							+7.5 (Euroskeptical)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptical	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (95).	EP Elect. (99)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Austria	SPO	no (s)	yes	38.1	31.7	-6.4		yes	
	OVP	no	yes	28.3	30.7	+2.4			
	FPO	yes (s)	no	22.0	23.4	+1.4			
	LIF	no	no	5.5	2.7	- 2.8			
	Greens	yes (s)	no	4.8	9.3	+4.5			
	KPO	no	no	0.3	0.7	+0.4			
							-2.4		
							+5.9 (Euroskeptical)		

Country	Party	Euroskeptical	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (90)	EP Elect. (94)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Germany	CDU	no (f)(h)	yes	34.9	32	-2.9		yes	
	CSU	no (f)	yes	7.1	6.8	-0.3			no
	FDP	yes (s)	yes	11.0	4.1	-6.9			-6.9 (s)
	SPD	no (f)	no	33.5	32.2	-1.3			
	Greens	yes (s)	no	3.8	10.1	+6.3			
	PDS	yes (s)	no	2.2	4.7	+2.5			
	NPD	yes (h)	no	0.3	0.2	-0.1			
	BP	no	no	0.1	0.3	+0.2			
	ODP	yes (s)	no	0.4	0.8	+0.4			
	REP	yes (h)	no	2.1	3.9	+1.2			
	PBC	yes (s)	no	0	0.3	+0.3			
	GRAUE	yes (s)	no	0.8	0.8	0			
	BfB	yes (s)	no	0	1.1	+1.1			
	CM	yes (s)	no	0	0.2	+0.2			
						-1.1			
						+11.9 (Euroskeptical)			

Country	Party	Euroskeptical	Gov. Party	Nat. Elect. (98)	EP Elect. (99)	Vote Difference	Total Opposition	Second-Order	Our
Germany	CDU	no (f)(h)	yes	28.4	39.3	-10.9		yes	
	CSU	no (f)	yes	6.8	9.4	+2.6			yes
	FDP	yes (s)	yes	6.2	3.0	-3.2			-3.2 (s)
	SPD	no (f)	no	40.9	30.7	-10.2			
	Greens	yes (s)	no	6.7	6.4	-0.3			
	PDS	yes (s)	no	5.1	5.8	+0.7			
	NPD	yes (h)	no	0.3	0.4	+0.1			
	BP	no	no	0.1	0.1	0			
	ODP	yes (s)	no	0.2	0.4	+0.2			
	REP	yes (h)	no	1.8	1.7	-0.1			
	PBC	yes (s)	no	0.1	0.3	+0.2			
	GRAUE	yes (s)	no	0.3	0	-0.3			
	BfB	yes (s)	no	0.2	0	-0.2			
	Family Party	no (s)	no	0.1	0	-0.1			
	Die Frauen	yes (s)	no	0.1	0.4	+0.3			
	German Union	yes (s)	no	1.2	0	-1.2			
	CM	yes (s)	no	0	0.1	+0.1			
							-10.0		
						-0.8 (Euroskeptical)			

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